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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the alleged assurances made to Moscow during German 
unification discussions in 1989-1990.  Specifically, Moscow alleges that Western 
governments offered assurances to the Soviet Union that NATO would not expand 
beyond its then current borders if Moscow agreed to allow a unified Germany to join 
NATO as a full member.  Since the first post-Cold War round of NATO expansion in 
1997-1999, Moscow has raised the issue of broken promises made to the Soviet Union 
several times.  While it can be argued that the Soviet Union had little choice but to yield 
to Western pressures, it appears that in 1990 some U.S. and West German officials gave 
informal assurances with respect to Soviet security concerns, including potential NATO 
expansion eastward.  This thesis examines the hypothesis that the United States, the 
Federal Republic of Germany, and other NATO countries did not make – and did not 
intend to make – a commitment ruling out future NATO enlargement, but that Soviet 
officials got the mistaken impression that such a commitment was made.  The thesis 
investigates whether this hypothesis is supported by the evidence and considers how the 
Soviets received this impression.  The thesis also discusses the implications of these 
misunderstandings for NATO-Russia relations.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The purpose of this study is to clarify the assurances given to the Soviet Union by 
NATO governments in 1990 concerning NATO enlargement to the east and to analyze 
the continuing implications of these assurances.  While the context of these assurances 
includes various aspects of German unification and the dissolution of the Soviet empire, 
the focus is on the specific assurances received by the Soviet Union concerning NATO 
enlargement following the unification of Germany.  Both explicit and implicit assurances 
are discussed, with due attention to expectations and intent.   
1. Importance 
This research is significant because Moscow has raised the issue of broken 
promises made to the Soviet Union several times since the first post-Cold War round of 
NATO expansion in 1997-1999.  Indeed, Alliance officials and experts anticipate hearing 
Russian complaints about Western betrayal whenever NATO enlargement is discussed.   
While Russia’s grumbling may seem irrelevant to many policy makers and political 
leaders in NATO countries, this study may offer useful insights to those seeking a fuller 
understanding of the Russian perspective on Western behavior.  
The diplomatic exchanges in highly charged and time-sensitive negotiations can 
have real and profound consequences.   The negotiations involving the Four Powers with 
rights and responsibilities concerning Germany (France, the Soviet Union, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States) and the two German states (the Federal Republic of 
Germany and the German Democratic Republic) in 1989-1990 about German unification 
included backroom and off-the-record discussions.  The informal and formal dialogue 
produced the necessary trust-building foundations for fruitful settlements, including 
agreement on the withdrawal of Soviet forces from the unified Germany.  The 
negotiations led to the unification of Germany with its inclusion in NATO as a full 
member and a formal end to Four Power rights.   
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While it can be argued that the Soviet Union had little choice but to yield to 
Western pressures, given that Soviet-allied Communist regimes were dissolving in 
Eastern and Central Europe, it appears that in 1990 some officials in NATO governments 
gave assurances with respect to Soviet security concerns, including potential NATO 
expansion eastward.  Explicit denial by NATO governments of any such assurances when 
post-Cold War NATO expansion was first discussed in the mid-1990s confounded and 
outraged many Russian observers.  Russia’s irritation in this regard persists today.  
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s Munich speech in February 2007 relates the 
contemporary perception of many in Russia:   
And what happened to the assurances our western partners made after the 
dissolution of the Warsaw Pact?  Where are those declarations today?  No one even 
remembers them.  But I will allow myself to remind this audience what was said.  I 
would like to quote the speech of NATO General Secretary Mr. Wöerner in Brussels on 
17 May 1990.  He said at the time that: “the fact that we are ready not to place a NATO 
army outside of German territory gives the Soviet Union a firm security guarantee.”  
Where are these guarantees?1 
Russian actions also constitute evidence of this apparent disagreement as to the 
nature and content of the assurances given to Moscow in 1990.  The August 2008 conflict 
between Russian and Georgian forces in Georgia and the security concerns voiced by 
Ukraine can be viewed as, at least in part, consequences of a Russian backlash to 
NATO’s expressions of openness to eventual membership for Georgia and Ukraine at the 
Bucharest Summit in April 2008.  Russian objections to Georgian and Ukrainian 
accession to NATO are illustrations of the distrust between NATO and Russia.  This 
distrust stems in part, it seems, from the disagreement about the assurances that Moscow 
maintains that it received in 1990.   
                                                 
1 Vladimir Putin, 10 February 2007, “Speech at the 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy,” 
Munich Conference on Security Policy, 
http://www.securityconference.de/konferenzen/rede.php?sprache=en&id=179. 
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B. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
The question of exactly what assurances were given to the Soviet Union in 
exchange for accepting German unification, including NATO membership for the unified 
Germany, should be placed in historical context.  The published record suggests that 
there were in fact assurances made to the Soviet Union with respect to NATO 
enlargement.  These assurances were given with consideration to Soviet security concerns 
and in the context of geopolitical balance-of-power dynamics.  The following question 
stands out as one of critical significance: should these assurances apply in changed 
political circumstances, including the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the fall of the 
Soviet Union?  From the Russian perspective they clearly remain valid.  Russian officials 
and experts maintain that, while the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union no longer exist, 
balance-of-power issues are still relevant, specifically with respect to alliance 
commitments, conventional forces, and nuclear forces.  Additionally, Russians assert that 
Moscow should have an equal voice in European security discussions and hold that the 
expansion of NATO further east jeopardizes Russian security interests. 
This thesis examines the hypothesis that the United States, the Federal Republic 
of Germany, and other NATO countries did not make – and did not intend to make – a 
commitment ruling out future NATO enlargement, but that Soviet officials got the 
mistaken impression that such a commitment was made.  The thesis investigates whether 
this hypothesis is supported by the evidence and considers how the Soviets received this 
impression. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In conducting research for this thesis, a variety of sources were consulted.  
Western sources, including official and direct participant accounts, as well as secondary 
sources and analytical works, were helpful in gaining a better understanding of the debate 
surrounding the assurances allegedly offered to the Soviet Union.  Russian sources were 
examined to obtain a clearer view of Moscow’s perspective on the perceived assurances 
regarding NATO expansion.  
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In attempting to understand the formal and informal positions taken during the 
German unification process, it is important to gather as much information as possible and 
strive to analyze all sides of the debate.  In this controversy there are at least four distinct 
positions: those of the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, 
the United States, and the Soviet Union.  France and the United Kingdom (the other 
countries in the so-called “2 plus 4” negotiations) acknowledged that German unification 
was unavoidable but favored a slower process to control possible destabilizing aspects of 
this unification.  However, France and the United Kingdom do not appear to have offered 
the Soviet Union any assurances about the possibility of NATO enlargement after 
German unification.  The subject seems not to have been raised with London and Paris.   
It is important to compare the differing positions to appreciate the distinct 
concerns of specific observers.  From the U.S. perspective, definitive accounts closely 
narrate and analyze the unification process and outcome.  These include Germany 
Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft, by Philip Zelikow and 
Condoleezza Rice; former Secretary of State James Baker III’s memoirs, entitled The 
Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War, and Peace, 1989-1992; and A World 
Transformed, by former President George H. W. Bush and his National Security Advisor, 
Brent Scowcroft.  All provide descriptions by insiders of the diplomatic efforts made by 
all the principal players in the German unification discussions.   
For example, Zelikow and Rice recount a conversation between Baker and Eduard 
Shevardnadze, then the Soviet Foreign Minister:  
To ease Soviet concerns, Baker used the formula he had picked up from 
[Hans-Dietrich] Genscher [then the Foreign Minister of the Federal 
Republic of Germany] and, turning Genscher’s ‘no extension of NATO’ 
language into a more lawyerly formulation, promised that if a united 
Germany were included in NATO, there would be ironclad guarantees 
‘that NATO’s jurisdiction or forces would not move eastward.2   
 
                                                 
2 Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in 
Statecraft (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995), 180. 
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This precise information is historically invaluable and provides the foundation 
necessary for an analysis of the U.S. position as it was subsequently developed and 
clarified.  While the above works present a distinctly Western perception and place the 
United States in a decidedly central role in the German unification process, they are 
foundational texts that were composed on the basis of direct participation in the events or 
special access to pertinent documents.  They must therefore be included in any study of 
the German unification process. 
The pace of events leading up to German unification took both participants and 
observers by surprise.  Journalists nonetheless made invaluable contributions to the 
historical record.  In her books Beyond the Wall: Germany’s Road to Unification, and 
After the Wall: American Policy Toward Germany, Elizabeth Pond, a journalist based in 
Germany and a discerning witness to German unification, cast a critical eye on the 
celebrated episode.  Her work as a reporter in Bonn for nearly a decade allowed for 
timely access to the major European political figures and enabled her to quickly analyze 
cause and effect.   With regard to Genscher’s proposed plan for German inclusion in 
NATO and its implications, she wrote, “This package quickly became NATO’s position.  
It extended NATO protection to the area of the GDR (though this was not immediately 
clear), yet still offered unilateral restraint.  It could, the West hoped, save face for 
Gorbachev and let him argue to his domestic critics that NATO was not, as the 
Americans put it, ‘taking advantage of’ the Soviet loss of empire.”3  Pond provides the 
perspective of an authoritative unofficial witness of events, and this is historically 
necessary for comprehensiveness.    
As might be anticipated, much has been written with respect to the German role in 
the negotiation process.  For example, Pekka Kalevi Hämäläinen and Manfred 
Görtemaker, in their books Uniting Germany: Actions and Reactions and Unifying 
Germany, 1989-1990 respectively, give German-centered accounts of unification.  They 
 
 
                                                 
3 Elizabeth Pond, After the Wall: American Policy Toward Germany (New York: Brookings Institution, 
1990), 44. 
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provide comprehensive analyses from the perspective of Germany’s central role in the 
high-paced negotiations.  Russian perceptions of broken promises and false assurances 
have had, and may continue to have, far-reaching implications. 
D. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis undertakes a critical analysis of the historical evidence regarding 
different interpretations of the commitments regarding NATO enlargement expressed by 
key Alliance governments during the 1989-1990 German unification process.  The thesis 
examines the historical record and available analyses of the explicit and implicit 
assurances, with special attention to expectations and intentions.  While most Western 
sources provide similar accounts, differences exist in perspective and with regard to the 
significance of particular dialogues.   
While there was no talk of NATO enlargement immediately after the unification 
of Germany in October 1990 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991, 
discussions about expanding the Alliance began in early 1993.  By 1999, NATO had 
expanded to include three former Warsaw Pact members (the Czech Republic, Hungary 
and Poland).4  In 2004 three more former Warsaw Pact members (Bulgaria, Romania, 
and Slovakia), three former Soviet republics (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), and one 
former Yugoslav republic (Slovenia) joined NATO.  The thesis discusses Russia’s 
reactions to these events in light of the Russian view that commitments not to enlarge 
NATO have been violated.  The thesis then considers implications for further NATO 
enlargement.  Moreover, this thesis examines the importance of trust-building and the 
possible consequences of deficiencies in trust in U.S.-Russian and NATO-Russian 
relations.    
E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis is organized as follows.  Chapter II reviews the perspective of the 
Federal Republic of Germany and describes the assurances given to Moscow by FRG 
officials in return for Soviet agreement to Germany’s unification and membership in 
                                                 
4 The Czech Republic was part of Czechoslovakia until 1993.  Czechoslovakia was a member state of 
the Warsaw Pact from 1955 to 1991. 
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NATO.  Chapter III examines the implicit and explicit assurances given to the Soviet 
Union from the United States perspective and explains why these assurances were critical 
to the unification process.  Chapter IV reviews NATO positions, including British and 
French views, and offers evidence that may explain why Moscow was convinced that 
NATO would not expand beyond the territory of the GDR if the Soviet Union agreed to a 
united Germany in NATO. Chapter V examines the Soviet perspective and, following the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian perspective.  This chapter includes the Soviet 
understandings of the assurances that the United States and the Federal Republic of 
Germany offered and why those assurances were important to Soviet decision-making 
about German unification and European security.  The thesis concludes with a discussion 
of the consequences and implications of the 1990 misunderstanding between the Soviet 
Union and key Western governments, including the loss of the trust gained during the 
German unification discussions.     
 
 8
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II. THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF 
GERMANY 
This chapter reviews the perspective of the Federal Republic of Germany and 
discusses the assurances given to the Soviet Union by FRG officials in return for 
Moscow’s agreement to Germany’s unification and membership in NATO.   
After the fall of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989, many Germans demanded 
that talks begin regarding the unification of Germany.  As the leading powers of NATO 
and the Warsaw Pact, the United States and the Soviet Union, respectively, had key roles 
in this process, which resulted in a united Germany on 3 October 1990.  Central to the 
unification discussions was the united Germany’s relationship with NATO.  The Federal 
Republic of Germany (the FRG, West Germany) was a member of NATO, and the 
German Democratic Republic (the GDR, East Germany) was a member of the Warsaw 
Pact.  The FRG and the United States were determined that a united Germany be a full 
member of NATO, while the Soviet Union preferred different arrangements. 
In the East, both the Soviet and East German elites had reservations about the 
unification.  Moscow was witnessing the end of an empire.  The GDR had come to be 
viewed as not just a product of the Soviet Union’s post-World War II occupation zone 
but as an independent state integral to European balance and security.  Moreover, “The 
belief was also widespread that the GDR was not only an international necessity but in 
time had become a natural entity.  In this view its existence was necessary for the 
stability of Europe and the precarious balance between the East and West and it had 
succeeded in creating its own identity embraced by its people.”5   
The FRG’s Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, in the unexpected turn of events brought 
about by the fall of the wall, became a hero of German unification.  Prior to November 
1989, Kohl had enjoyed lukewarm popularity at best.  West Germany had in recent years 
been politically divided with respect to nuclear weapons and other issues in NATO 
strategy.  A growing left-wing movement led by the Social Democratic Party (SPD) had 
                                                 
5 Pekka Kalevi Hämäläinen, Uniting Germany: Actions and Reactions (Boulder: Westview Press, 
1994), p. 58. 
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called for “an undefined security partnership between Bonn and Moscow.”6  This was in 
response to left-wing intellectuals who tended to equate cooperation with American 
hegemony in Western Europe with coercive Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe.7  
Despite increasing pressure from the left, Kohl held that preserving solidarity with 
Washington was essential in maintaining Western unity.   Moreover, Kohl had been a 
long promoter of a one-Germany policy, dismissed by most in West Germany as 
unrealistic.  It was in this context that Kohl, when visiting Berlin on 10 November, stood 
on a podium and declared: “We are and remain one nation.  We belong together.”8  Kohl 
had taken the historic initiative and thrust himself into a central role in unification 
negotiations.   
Despite the absence of a clear mandate from the Four Powers to do so, Kohl 
delivered a ten-point plan for German unification on 28 November 1989.  His plan 
outlined both internal and external paths to unification, specifically including the 
European Community (EC) and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(CSCE) as institutional necessities for unification.  Additionally, intentionally or not, 
when he addressed “transnational security structures,” there was no mention of NATO or 
the Warsaw Pact, but simply “an organic development which takes into consideration the 
interests of all parties concerned and guarantees a peace order in Europe.”9  
Communicating his disapproval of Kohl’s plan in a telephone conversation on 10 
December 1989, Gorbachev, speaking with the new chairman of the Socialist Unity Party 
– Party of Democratic Socialism (SED-PDS), Gregor Gysi, “stated that the Soviet Union 
would reject any attempt by the West to infringe on East German sovereignty.  ‘The 
stability of the German Democratic Republic depends, in no small degree, on the stability 
of the European continent,’ he told Gysi.”10   
                                                 
6 Elizabeth Pond, Beyond the Wall: Germany’s Road to Unification (Washington: Brookings 
Institution, 1993), p. 29. do not use p. or pp. for pages; just use numbers; revise all 
7 Ibid., p. 29. 
8 Kohl quoted in Pekka Kalevi Hämäläinen, Uniting Germany: Actions and Reactions (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1994), p. 68. 
9 Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in 
Statecraft (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995), p. 120. 
10 Manfred Görtemaker, Unifying Germany, 1989-1990 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), p. 111. 
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For the East German elite, German unification represented the final nail in the 
coffin of their political future.  They were witnessing peaceful revolutions in many of the 
surrounding Eastern Bloc countries with reforms being implemented more rapidly than 
anyone had anticipated six months earlier.  Power was slipping quickly through their 
fingers and German unification guaranteed a reduction of their personal influence.  That 
German unification occurred at all, and the swiftness with which it was implemented, 
constitute a testament to the statesmen involved in the process and to the resolve of the 
German people as a whole.   
In January 1990, discussions began that attempted to address the security 
arrangements of a united Germany.  An early proposal, presented by GDR Prime 
Minister Hans Modrow after he recognized the inevitability of unification, was for a 
neutral united Germany, disavowing membership in both NATO and the Warsaw Pact.11  
This position “envisioned a treaty setting the course for German unity, implying a gradual 
step-by-step path toward a new confederation.”12  The Modrow proposal was flatly 
rejected by the West and was considered to be a signal for negotiations to begin for the 
united Germany’s international security arrangement.13   
Modrow’s plan was initially welcomed by Moscow for at least two reasons.  First, 
Gorbachev was committed to the idea of national self-determination for the two 
Germanys and Modrow’s plan clearly supported this.  Second and more importantly, 
Gorbachev was in a precarious position.  Moscow was quickly seeing its hold on Eastern 
Europe give way and the perception by many hard-line conservatives in Moscow was that 
Gorbachev was responsible.  From the perspective of Gorbachev and other Soviet 
leaders, Modrow’s plan, while doing little to stall unification talks, at least prevented a 
strengthening of NATO.   
                                                 
11 Pekka Kalevi Hämäläinen, Uniting Germany: Actions and Reactions (Boulder: Westview Press, 
1994), p. 108. 
12 Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in 
Statecraft (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995), p. 174.   
13 Elizabeth Pond, Beyond the Wall: Germany’s Road to Unification (Washington: Brookings 
Institution, 1993), p. 171. 
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Furthermore, for Moscow the logic of a neutral Germany seemed clear.  Elizabeth 
Pond writes, “The corollaries were implicit: if a united Germany could not be a member 
of NATO, that meant that West Germany would quit the Western alliance, and if the 
Federal Republic withdrew from NATO, Congress would surely pull back U.S. forces 
deployed in the Federal Republic and elsewhere on the continent.”14  It was for this 
reason that the Modrow plan was first agreed to by Gorbachev and rejected outright by 
Kohl and Bush.   
At about the same time Modrow announced his plan, Bonn announced its own 
plan for the united Germany’s external security arrangement.  “The first Western officials 
to define the parallel needs of avoiding humiliation of Moscow and confrontation 
between NATO and unification in West Germany were Foreign Minister Genscher and 
Kohl’s security adviser, Horst Teltschik.”15  On 31 January 1990 Genscher outlined a 
possible compromise: “Genscher proposed that there be ‘no expansion of NATO territory 
eastward.’  The former GDR would not be incorporated into NATO or NATO’s military 
structures.  Indeed, NATO itself, along with the Warsaw Pact, would become ‘elements’ 
of new ‘cooperative security structures throughout Europe.’”16   
This was the first time that Moscow was assured that the government of the FRG 
was exploring an arrangement whereby NATO would not be expanded eastward.  
Genscher’s proposal also implied that NATO, in its current arrangement, would be 
transformed into an entity oriented toward “cooperative security” relations with the 
Soviet Union.  Further, the implication was that there would be shared decision making in 
European security affairs, offering Moscow an active role in the management of 
international security affairs in Europe.   
Central to the security arrangement that Genscher proposed was the CSCE.  The 
suggestion of using the CSCE was deliberately advanced to appease the Soviets.  
                                                 
14 Ibid.,  p. 175. do not use Ibid as first footnote on a page; revise 
15 Elizabeth Pond, After the Wall: American Policy Toward Germany (New York: Brookings 
Institution, 1990), p. 44. 
16 Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in 
Statecraft (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995), pp. 174-175. 
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Moscow saw in the CSCE a possible and reasonable basis for a new security arrangement 
because it would give the Soviet Union an equal voice in European security affairs.  For 
Genscher’s plan to work, the CSCE would have to be strengthened “with a new 
framework to be agreed on at the CSCE summit,”17 which was proposed by the Soviets 
for sometime in 1990.  Unclear in the plan, and of particular concern to the United States, 
was how a united Germany could be absorbed into NATO without expanding the 
Alliance’s security commitments to include the former GDR.  Intelligence reports 
available to American officials pointed to Genscher’s lack of logic and alleged that 
“Genscher saw NATO as continuing only in the short term, and that he was considering 
announcing new pan-European security ideas later in 1990.”18  Genscher’s plan placed 
the Americans in a difficult position.  The United States did not want to be seen as 
standing in the way of unifying Germany and any public objection to German proposals 
threatened to limit U.S. leverage in the process.  While the details would be negotiated, 
the Genscher Plan would later form the framework for a final settlement and the 
foundation for two-plus-four negotiations.   
On 28 January 1990, after consultation with Secretary of State James Baker, State 
Department Director of Policy Planning Dennis Ross began developing a concept for 
German unification discussions that would later be known as the two-plus-four concept.  
This formula would allow for the two Germanys to negotiate their domestic affairs 
(economic, legal, political, etc.) without external interference.  External elements of 
unification, particularly the international security arrangements of a unified Germany, 
would be equally discussed among the Four Powers (Britain, France, the Soviet Union 
and the United States), the GDR and the FRG.19   
While the two-plus-four concept was being considered and debated, a more 
fundamental question had yet to be answered.  Would Moscow agree to a unified 
Germany?  The issue would be settled on 10 February 1990 when Kohl met with 
                                                 
17 Ibid., p. 175.  do not use Ibid as first footnote on a page; revise 
18 Ibid., p. 175. 
19 Manfred Görtemaker, Unifying Germany, 1989-1990 (New York: St. Martin’s Press,  
1994), p. 160. 
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Gorbachev in Moscow.  During the course of their meeting, Kohl outlined the current 
state of German affairs since the opening of the Berlin wall in November 1989 and 
pressed the point that unification was “irresistible and unstoppable.”20  Kohl approached 
the subject of alliances with care.   
Neutralization of Germany would be ‘unacceptable and a historical stupidity,’ as 
Germany’s post-1918 isolation and Schaukelpolitik had shown, Kohl stated.  He would 
be prepared, however, to take the security interests of the Soviet Union into account and 
could therefore imagine not extending NATO to the territory of the GDR.21   
After several more exchanges between the two, Gorbachev leaned forward and 
quietly said that 
There were no differences of opinion…between the Soviet Union, the Federal 
Republic of Germany, and the GDR about unity and the people’s right to strive for it; the 
people had to know themselves in what direction they wanted to go; the Germans in both 
East and West had already proven that they had drawn their lesson from history; no war 
would start on German soil.22 
This historical breakthrough between Germany and the Soviet Union allowed for 
the start of formal negotiations. 
It was on 13 February 1990 in Ottawa that the two-plus-four concept was agreed 
to by all parties.  A two-plus-four conference would be established to negotiate the 
external elements of German unification and the final termination of Four Power rights 
and responsibilities that had been in place since the end of World War II.  This two-plus-
four conference would become the formal body for German unification negotiations and 
lead to a settlement at a pace faster than most had anticipated or, in some cases, even felt 
comfortable with.   
 
                                                 
20 Ibid., p. 136. do not use Ibid as first footnote on a page; revise 
21 Ibid., p. 136. 
22 Ibid., p. 136. 
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While the two-plus-four framework embodied the formal functions of negotiation, 
security guarantees would be sought by any means available.  In the months leading up to 
the first two-plus-four meeting, there were meetings among the various organizations and 
key countries involved in the unification process, including meetings among Western 
leaders, bilateral Western-Soviet discussions, NATO meetings, and European 
Community meetings.  At the top of the agenda at nearly all meetings was the disposition 
of Germany with regard to NATO.  At the first two-plus-four meeting, there was near 
consensus among the participating countries (except for the Soviet Union) that the united 
Germany should be included in NATO.  At first the Soviets had insisted that a unified 
Germany should be neutral, but by April 1990 they had softened their position but 
retained the insistence that a unified Germany could not be part of NATO.23  
Recognizing the growing economic difficulty in the Soviet Union, confirmed by a 
request by Shevardnadze for German credit guarantees, Kohl understood the precarious 
position that Gorbachev was in.  Mounting economic pressure, coupled with hard-line 
Communist Party opposition to a unified Germany in NATO, threatened Gorbachev’s 
position of power.  In an effort to bolster domestic support for Gorbachev and to persuade 
him to accept the idea of a united Germany in NATO, Kohl decided to help.  In mid-May 
1990, following a confidential credit assessment visit to Moscow by German banking 
officials, Kohl agreed to help Gorbachev with approximately DM5 billion worth of credit 
guarantees.24   
In a further effort to reassure Moscow and garner acceptance of a unified 
Germany in NATO, Foreign Minister Genscher met with Shevardnadze in Geneva on 23 
May 1990 with a package of concessions.  Included was an offer to pay upwards of $750 
million a year for at least five years for the continued deployment of Soviet troops in East 
Germany, new bank credits, economic aid, the assumption by West Germany of East 
German contracts to supply the Soviets with uranium, and a promise to urge NATO to 
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revise its strategy of flexible response.25  Nevertheless, Gorbachev continued to maintain 
his position that a united Germany should not be part of NATO.  His logic was that “the 
West would certainly oppose a reunified Germany’s joining the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact, 
and therefore the West should sympathize with the Soviet Union’s opposition to a 
reunified Germany in NATO.”26  Moscow preferred the creation of a cooperative security 
structure for Europe as a whole, preferably under the auspices of the CSCE, and would be 
much more willing to discuss a unified Germany in NATO if the Alliance were of a 
political rather than a military nature.  While many in Europe were willing to discuss 
exactly that, U.S. policy makers were adamantly opposed to any radical change in the 
Alliance’s collective defense function.   
The difficult negotiations to gain Moscow’s agreement to a united Germany in 
NATO were concluded on 15 July 1990.   In response to an invitation from Gorbachev to 
meet with him in his hometown of Stavropol, Kohl flew to Moscow in 14 July.  The next 
day, before departing for Stavropol, Kohl, his diplomatic advisor Horst Teltschik, and his 
interpreter Andreas Weiss met with Gorbachev, his advisor Anatoly Chernayev, and 
interpreter Ivan Kurpakov.  During this private meeting Kohl and Gorbachev openly 
discussed the much-debated external elements of German unification, specifically, a 
united Germany’s relationship with NATO.27  Gorbachev began by pointing out the 
importance of a normalized German-Soviet relationship.  Kohl interrupted and brought 
Gorbachev to the real points of contention: 
When Kohl interjected that three points were important now – the withdrawal of 
Soviet forces from the GDR, the membership of a united Germany in NATO, and the 
future ceiling of the armed forces of a unified Germany – Gorbachev paused for a 
moment.  Then he quietly and earnestly conceded that Germany could remain a member 
                                                 
25 Constantine C. Menges, The Future of Germany and the Atlantic Alliance (Washington: AEI Press, 
1991), p. 106. 
26 Ibid., p. 106. do not use Ibid as first footnot on a page; revise to complete footnote  
27 Manfred Görtemaker, Unifying Germany, 1989-1990 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), p. 194. 
 17
of NATO if the scope of the alliance was not extended to the territory of the GDR as long 
as Soviet forces were stationed there.28 
The German question was now settled, but the agreement would remain secret 
until formal negotiations resumed the next morning. 
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III. THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE UNITED STATES 
This chapter reviews the implicit and explicit assurances given to the Soviet 
Union by United States representatives and explains why these assurances were critical to 
the unification process.   
This chapter is intended to clarify the assurances given to the Soviet Union by the 
United States in 1990 concerning NATO enlargement to the east and to consider the 
continuing implications of these assurances.  While the context of these assurances 
includes various aspects of German unification and the dissolution of the Soviet empire, 
the focus is on the specific assurances received by the Soviet Union concerning NATO 
enlargement following the unification of Germany.  Both explicit and implicit assurances 
are discussed, with due attention to expectations and intent.   
Of paramount concern to the West during the negotiations was helping the Soviet 
Union psychologically manage the loss of its empire.  Not only was there a call for 
German unification, but also many of the Warsaw Pact members were instituting reforms 
that put the future of the Warsaw Pact in jeopardy.  Shevardnadze candidly 
acknowledged to Baker the road ahead for the dying Soviet empire: “[W]e have a 
problem with NATO.  It’s an imagery problem.  It would look as if you had won and we 
had lost.  The short-term problem is, how can we explain this domestically?  The long-
term problem is, how do you know that what we’ll see ten years from now is going to be 
what we want?”29  By January 1990, the problem for Gorbachev was not German 
unification per se; it was how to sell the concept to his people, particularly conservative 
Communist Party members.  According to Jack Matlock, who was the U.S. ambassador 
to the USSR during the German unification negotiations, “With the Warsaw Pact already 
in the final stages of dissolution, the image of NATO expanding to include all of 
Germany while Soviet troops abandoned the area and the other Soviet ‘allies’ became 
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neutral and potentially hostile suggested to the public a Soviet defeat tantamount to 
losing a war.”30  It was in the above context that the negotiations for German unification 
took place.   
A short time after the announcement of the Genscher Plan, Genscher told 
Secretary of State Baker about his concerns with respect to the Soviets.  “Baker 
understood Genscher to say that Germany would remain in NATO, but the Soviets had to 
be assured that NATO’s territorial coverage would not extend to the former GDR.”31  
Baker understood Genscher’s concern and kept it in mind when he met with 
Shevardnadze in Moscow on 8 February 1990.  A key idea that Baker wanted to impress 
upon Shevardnadze was that the United States opposed the Modrow plan and that the 
USSR should be concerned as well with the prospect of a neutral Germany.  A Germany 
not anchored in a political institution such as NATO might acquire nuclear weapons.32   
One of the benefits of maintaining a united Germany in NATO would be that 
NATO would provide a built-in check on potential German armament ventures.  Further, 
to directly address the Soviet Union’s security concerns from a strategic perspective, 
Baker offered Shevardnadze a bold assurance: “Baker used the formula he had picked up 
from Genscher and, turning Genscher’s ‘no extension of NATO’ language into a more 
lawyerly formulation, promised that if a united Germany were included in NATO, there 
would be ironclad guarantees ‘that NATO’s jurisdiction or forces would not move 
eastward.’”33   
In a meeting the next day with Gorbachev, Baker reiterated his position: “there 
would be no extension of NATO’s jurisdiction for forces of NATO one inch to the 
east.”34  Later in the meeting, while considering the options of an independent neutral 
Germany without U.S. forces or a Germany tied to NATO with assurances that NATO 
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would not extend its current jurisdiction eastward, Gorbachev stated that one thing was 
clear: “‘Any extension of the zone of NATO is unacceptable.’  ‘I agree,’ Baker 
replied.”35   
These exchanges between Baker and both Shevardnadze and Gorbachev are 
examples of clear, explicit, informal assurances given to Moscow in the hopes of 
preventing the pursuance of neutrality for Germany while addressing Soviet geopolitical 
security concerns.  These exchanges are, however, absent from Secretary of State Baker’s 
memoirs.  His account reads, “Gorbachev said, ‘Certainly, any extension of the zone of 
NATO is unacceptable.’  But he also said, ‘I believe the presence of U.S. troops could be 
very constructive and be positive in the situation as it evolves…The lessons of the past 
tell us that Germany must stay within European structures.’”36  It is important to note that 
Baker’s account of the discussion with Gorbachev omits any mention of commitments 
made to limit NATO expansion.  In fact, while Baker was in Moscow, the White House 
instructed Baker “to limit his concessions to the Soviets to the principle that only German 
forces could be stationed on the territory of the former East Germany.”37 
Jack F. Matlock, who was then the U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union and 
closely involved in the negotiations, also alluded to the 9 February 1990 meeting.  In 
Congressional testimony given on 20 June 1996, Matlock recounted his understanding of 
certain assurances given to Gorbachev: “We began to talk to them about ways we could 
change NATO’s strategy to make it more acceptable, and finally, Gorbachev did get an 
informal, but clear, commitment that if Germany united and stayed in NATO, the borders 
of NATO would not move eastward.  All right, that wasn’t a legal commitment, but it 
was made.”38  Matlock confirmed this recollection in an interview with Michael R. 
Gordon for an article entitled “The Anatomy of a Misunderstanding.”  Matlock stated, 
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“When Gorbachev and others say that it is their understanding NATO expansion would 
not happen, there is a basis for it.”39  According to Gordon, “Mr. Matlock said the 
Russians have a point when they say Mr. Gorbachev received a blanket promise that 
NATO would not expand.  Mr. Baker, he said, never formally retracted the pledge that 
NATO’s ‘jurisdiction’ would not extend eastward.”40  In preparation for his article, 
Gordon also interviewed Baker.  Baker stated that “he never intended to rule out the 
admission of new NATO members.  ‘I got off the word ‘jurisdiction’ very quickly…I do 
not recall using it with the Soviets.  But let’s assume I did use it once or twice.  We 
quickly walked away from it.’”41    
Matlock’s accounts do not specify which meetings he attended or who was 
involved.  Some insight into these questions can be found in Hannes Adomeit’s working 
paper entitled Gorbachev’s Consent to Unified Germany’s Membership in NATO.  In an 
interview on 10 February 1997 Matlock revealed that he was present at the meeting 
between Gorbachev and Baker on 9 February 1990, and he confirmed the accuracy of the 
report about the exchange cited earlier when Gorbachev said, “Any extension of the zone 
of NATO is unacceptable,” and Baker replied, “I agree.”42  While this interview helps to 
clarify the context of Matlock’s 1996 congressional testimony, it does present another 
inconsistency in the published accounts of this controversial and important exchange.  
Zelikow and Rice specifically identify who was present at the 9 February 1990 meeting: 
“Baker was accompanied by Dennis Ross, who took notes, and an interpreter.  Gorbachev 
was joined by Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, a note taker, and an interpreter.”43  This 
depiction appears definitive, yet is clearly inconsistent with Matlock’s statement.   
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In contrast, in an article published in 1995, Philip Zelikow adamantly rejected the 
view that an assurance was made whichthat prevented NATO from expanding.  He wrote 
that the talks in early February 1990 were focused on NATO expansion into the former 
East German state.  According to Zelikow, “There is no evidence that in late January or 
early February of 1990 anyone — Mr. Genscher, James Baker or Mikhail Gorbachev — 
was even thinking, much less talking, about the possibility of NATO expansion even 
further into East-Central Europe.”44  He wrote that, while the offer to not expand NATO 
eastward into the territory of the GDR may have been given, revisions to that offer were 
made and agreed upon by the Soviets in July 1990 that would include NATO security 
coverage for all of a united Germany.  Zelikow concluded, “the option of adding new 
members to NATO has not been foreclosed by the deal actually made in 1990.”45  In 
other words, Zelikow’s position is that controversial assurances were discussed in the 
context of, and limited to, NATO and Germany.  U.S. Secretary of State Madeline 
Albright took this position as well in Congressional testimony discussing NATO 
expansion: 
The treaty on the Final Settlement with respect to Germany that was signed in 
1990 had to do only with German unification and how NATO would act within Germany, 
and the treaty restrictions do not apply with respect to other states to the west or east of 
Germany and therefore have no bearing on NATO enlargement.46 
The claim that assurances were made outside the context of the German question 
and its relationship with NATO necessarily redefines the entire context and content of the 
negotiation process.   
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IV. BRITISH, FRENCH AND NATO PERSPECTIVES 
This chapter considers NATO positions, including British and French views, and 
discusses evidence that may explain why Moscow was convinced that NATO would not 
expand beyond the territory of the GDR if the Soviet Union agreed to a united Germany’s 
membership in NATO. 
In retrospect, German unification in 1990 seems to have been almost inevitable.  
However, this was not the case at all.  When the euphoria over the possibility of German 
unification was heard the loudest, not everyone was encouraged by such a prospect.  The 
fall of the Berlin wall raised the question, “What of NATO and the Warsaw Pact?”  
When calls for German unification began, observers immediately began looking to 
history to best forge the way ahead.  For some in the West, former NATO secretary 
general Lord Ismay’s famous remark, that the alliance was formed to keep the 
“Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down,”47 came to mind.  Indeed, 
according to Pekka Kalevi Hämäläinen, “Some German observers commented, perhaps 
only half ironically, that they almost got the impression that most participants felt that 
NATO and the Warsaw Pact were needed because of the Germans rather than because of 
the East-West division.”48   
The British and the French, in particular, initially voiced concern over German 
unification.  Historically, both countries had suffered much at the hands of a powerful 
Germany; and, preceding the fall of the Berlin wall, they had witnessed the FRG’s 
economy boom.  “The economic weight of the Bundesrepublik had left both Britain and 
France clearly behind, but a united Germany would be in a different league.  The size of 
its economy would be close to the size of the British and French economies put 
together.”49   In an interview with the Wall Street Journal published on 26 January 1990, 
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British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher warned that, “if German unification went too 
fast, it could have the disastrous effect of toppling Gorbachev.  It would in any case 
disrupt the economic balance within the EC, where Germany already dominated.”50  
This comment is placed in its proper context in Thatcher’s memoir The Downing 
Street Years.  She recalled a meeting in September 1989 with Gorbachev.  “I explained to 
him that although NATO had traditionally made statements supporting Germany’s 
aspiration to be reunited, in practice we were rather apprehensive.”51  Gorbachev 
confirmed “that the Soviet Union did not want German reunification either.”52  This 
meeting, occurring prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, appears to have 
set the tone for later remarks concerning German unification.   
In a meeting of European Community heads of government in Paris on 18 
November 1989, Thatcher forthrightly voiced her concerns regarding the political 
changes taking place in Eastern Europe.  She wrote:  
I said that though the changes taking place were historic we must not succumb to 
euphoria.  The changes were only just beginning and it would take several years to get 
genuine democracy and economic reform in eastern Europe.  There must be no question 
of changing borders.  The Helsinki Final Act must apply.  Any attempt to talk about 
either border changes or German reunification would undermine Mr. Gorbachev and also 
open up a Pandora’s box of border claims right through central Europe.53 
Thatcher’s unabashed desire for a slow and drawn-out German unification process 
was foundationally rooted in her fear of a strong, resurgent Germany.    Her perception 
was based on a belief in a German national character that has “since the unification of 
Germany under Bismark…veered unpredictably between aggression and self-doubt.”54  
She went on to write: “Moreover, Germany has always looked east as well as west, 
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though it is economic expansion rather than territorial aggression which is the modern 
manifestation of this tendency.  Germany is thus by its very nature a destabilizing rather 
than a stabilizing force in Europe.”55  This belief in Germany’s destabilizing nature led to 
Thatcher’s determination that a unified Germany be integrated in NATO, if for no other 
reason than to be watched over.  Indeed, she wrote, “Only the military and political 
engagement of the United States in Europe and close relations between the other two 
strongest sovereign states in Europe – Britain and France – are sufficient to balance 
German power.”56  Some French leaders shared Thatcher’s concerns, yet were more 
subtle in their approach. 
The memory of German occupation and brutality held deep roots among leading 
members of the French political elite.  In the eyes of some French observers, the Gaullist 
dream of French dominance in Europe was once again taking a back seat to the Federal 
Republic of Germany’s economic and now territorial expansion.  This time their fear was 
not German military dominance but, like that of the British, German economic 
supremacy.  French President François Mitterrand, unlike his British counterpart, was 
much more cunning in his objection to rapid German unification.  Mitterrand placed a 
portion of his argument in the context of the future of the EC and stressed that the EC 
should be deepened politically before being widened to include the more unstable 
economies of Central and Eastern Europe that Bonn had been supporting.57  In essence, 
his argument was that widening would come at the expense of deepening.   
This is not to say that Mitterrand was against German unification outright, 
however.  According to Frédéric Bozo, Professor of Contemporary History at the 
University of Sorbonne Nouvelle – Paris III, French policy concerning German 
unification and the changing dynamic in Europe in 1990 was straightforward: “it was, in 
the words of [Hubert] Védrine [the diplomatic advisor and chief of staff to Mitterrand], 
about ‘going along with the developments while trying at best to control possibly 
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destabilizing aspects.’”58  Contrary to the popular perception that France sought to 
impede, or even block, German unification, in fact Mitterrand’s underlying motivation 
for a controlled and multifaceted international framework for German unification was 
rooted in historical necessity.  Indeed, as Bozo noted, Mitterrand was preoccupied with 
the risk of a violent international upheaval: 
Hence, starting in 1989, the French president’s frequent references to ‘1913’ (the 
year of the Balkan war that was the prelude to the First World War), which, in his mind, 
epitomized the risk of fragmentation and nationalism associated with the end of the Cold 
War freeze, whether with regard to the liberation of Eastern Europe, to German 
unification, or, last but not least, to the dissolution of the Soviet Union and, of course, of 
Yugoslavia.59   
As with Thatcher, another aspect of Mitterrand’s concern as to the pace of 
German unification was rooted in an assessment of Moscow’s willingness to accept it.  
According to Bozo, Mitterrand’s “preoccupation with the interplay between the Soviet 
situation and the German question thus had a major role in his attitude with regard to the 
latter: hence his reservations as to the pace of unification until Gorbachev gave his ‘green 
light’ to GDR leader Hans Modrow in late January 1990.”60  While France’s role in 
German unification is often viewed as ancillary in nature, Bozo’s article challenges this 
perception to show that, though France was initially reluctant to fully acknowledge the 
rapidity of events, Paris would come to actively participate and encourage Germany’s 
unification and integration into European and Euro-Atlantic institutions.   
However, the available evidence suggests that neither France nor the United 
Kingdom offered Moscow any assurances about the prospect of NATO enlargement after 
Germany’s reunification.  That is, neither London nor Paris promised Moscow that future 
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NATO enlargement would not extend beyond the territory of the former East Germany.  
The subject seems not to have been raised in the discussions involving Britain and 
France.   
From a security perspective, a real concern to the West was the possibility of a 
jockeying for favor from a powerful Germany.  Both the West and the East would be 
tempted to court the economically powerful Germany, and this could lead to an escalation 
of East-West tension.  Also, lacking a collective defense umbrella, Germany could feel 
compelled to develop its own nuclear deterrent capability.  Once it was evident that 
German unification was in fact a reality at hand, this very fear would be the rallying point 
for a united Germany tied to NATO rather than neutralized and without the restraint of an 
alliance partnership.  With the United States taking the lead for the Alliance, negotiations 
began to develop quite quickly.   
After being briefed by Bush and Baker, Kohl and Gorbachev met on 10 February 
1990.  According to Zelikow and Rice, “Kohl said that Germany had to remain in NATO, 
but he could accept a plan restricting NATO forces (not NATO ‘jurisdiction’) to the 
former FRG.”61  While this commitment was less encompassing, it clearly was meant to 
accommodate Soviet security concerns.  This is consistent with a continuing theme in the 
discussions in early February 1990 regarding a united Germany and NATO and their 
relationship with the Soviet Union. Not only were there controversial conversations 
involving Baker, Genscher, Shevardnadze, Gorbachev, and Kohl; there was also a 
statement by NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner on 8 February 1990 regarding 
the potential for accommodations to Soviet concerns. 
In addition, special arrangements could be devised to take account of Soviet 
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component of such an arrangement could be a special military status for the territory of 
the GDR, or perhaps an agreement not to extend military integration to that territory. 
These are just two possibilities out of many which could be conceived.62 
In the span of three days, 8-10 February 1990, representatives from three 
distinctly different Western entities (the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, 
and NATO) all gave implicit or explicit assurances to limit the scope of NATO’s future 
aspirations.  The implication was that if the Soviets agreed to a united Germany in 
NATO, key members of the Alliance (Germany and the United States) would, in a quid 
pro quo, limit the geographical extent of NATO’s future membership.  In retrospect, this 
might well have been the deciding factor in the Soviet agreement to accept a united 
Germany fully integrated in NATO.  There would be a hard fought diplomatic battle in 
the coming months to finally garner a clear commitment from Moscow. 
While Washington and Bonn (in particular Chancellor Kohl) were pressing for 
NATO to remain central in future European security arrangements, some West German 
officials (Genscher above all) and Moscow were seeking new security arrangements in 
Europe with a distinctly European orientation that threatened to alienate the United States 
and mark the end of forty years of Alliance leadership in European affairs.   
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V. SOVIET AND RUSSIAN PERSPECTIVES 
This chapter examines the Soviet perspective on the alleged U.S. and West 
German assurances regarding NATO expansion and, following the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, the Russian perspective.  This chapter discusses why those perceived assurances 
were important to Soviet decision-making about German unification and European 
security.   
To appreciate the Soviet perspective regarding Germany’s unification and its 
prospective NATO membership, it is necessary to place the discussion in the proper 
context.  The Soviet Union was seeing the breakdown of communism in nearly all of the 
Warsaw Pact countries, namely Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and 
Romania, in addition to East Germany.  Just as alarming to Moscow were growing 
secessionist movements among the Soviet Union’s member republics, specifically the 
Baltic republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.  Economically, the Soviet Union was 
in crisis.  The command economy had been running in the red for years, valuable 
resources had been funneled into the losing war in Afghanistan, and the arms competition 
with the United States had consumed disproportionately massive inputs of technology 
and capital investment.  The result was a bankrupt system that could not meet the basic 
needs of its population well, resulting in widespread depression and domestic discontent.   
An emotional conviction that was able to withstand these great societal challenges 
(and that remains today) in Russia was a sense of national greatness, an almost fated 
greatness that history and geography guaranteed.  This feeling was well expressed in a 
striking article published in January 1993 in International Affairs (Moscow) by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation entitled “Russia is a Great Power,” 
written by Elgiz Pozdnyakov.  According to Pozdnyakov, “Our present life would seem 
to be devoid of anything visible bearing out the correctness and aptness of the words 
‘Russia is a great power.’  But while these words may sound surprising, I venture to 
affirm that few Russians will fail to perceive them as natural and their meaning as self-
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evident.”63  Pozdnyakov described Russia’s greatness as “genetic, inborn; it comes from 
the native soil itself, from its roots lying deep in history.  No rational proof is needed to 
confirm it – indeed, such proof could be counterproductive.”64  While this article was 
written following German unification and the collapse of both the Warsaw Pact and the 
Soviet Union, it describes a consistent historical theme in the Russian self-perception.  
This persistent theme is the emotional antithesis to the events that were witnessed in 
Eastern Europe in 1990.  The great Soviet empire was falling to pieces; the Soviet 
economic and political system was in turmoil, and it fell to Mikhail Gorbachev to manage 
these historical changes that flew in the face of every Russian’s sense of national identity 
and status.  To make matters worse, Gorbachev enjoyed a narrow margin of political 
control and was constantly trying to bolster his position within the Supreme Soviet, 
where he was often accused of squandering Soviet greatness.   
As a result of political reforms Gorbachev had been instituting in the Soviet 
Union, Soviet political control over Eastern Europe began to shift to a more permissive 
stance as early as 1986. In that year all the CSCE states adopted the Document of the 
Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament 
in Europe.  In this document the parties pledged “to refrain from the threat or use of force 
in their relations with any state, regardless of that state’s political, social, economic, or 
cultural system and irrespective of whether or not they maintain with that state relations 
of alliance.”65  In retrospect, some observers have argued, this pledge gave the green light 
for the communist governments of Eastern and Central Europe to manage their countries 
as they saw fit.  It was interpreted as obliging Moscow to abandon the Brezhnev 
Doctrine.  It also opened the door for dissenters to begin to make moves that would, in 
just three years, bring down the Wall and end the Cold War.   
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Another move that, some experts argue, sped up the process of democratization in 
Eastern and Central Europe was the successful conclusion of Intermediate-range Nuclear 
Forces (INF) negotiations.  The INF treaty was signed on 8 December 1987.    The INF 
agreement unexpectedly spurred on talks for conventional arms reduction in Europe.  In 
December 1988, primarily for economic reasons, Gorbachev announced a unilateral 
draw-down of military forces in the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary.  This included 
“removing from East Germany four tank divisions, close to 4,000 tanks, and the only 
Soviet air assault brigade in the GDR, and from Czechoslovakia and Hungary two further 
tank divisions.”66  The total withdrawals of 50,000 troops, in conjunction with tank cuts, 
from Eastern Europe equaled or exceeded requests from the West.  This move further 
enabled the citizens of the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries to act boldly, leading to the 
ousting of Communism in those countries in the course of 1989.   
The fall of the Berlin wall in November 1989 caught the leadership of the Soviet 
Union utterly unprepared to deal with the rapid events that were about to unfold.  The 
implications for Soviet foreign policy and the impact to the psyche of the USSR were 
immense.  In his autobiography, The Future Belongs to Freedom, Eduard Shevardnadze 
writes: “The conviction that the existence of two Germanys maintained the security of the 
Soviet Union and the whole continent was too deeply rooted.  We had paid an enormous 
price for it, and to write it off was inconceivable.”67  It is not surprising that on 29 
November 1989 Shevardnadze announced, in response to Kohl’s ten-point plan the 
previous day, a “warning of German ‘revanchism’… and opposed any European border 
changes.”68  Indeed, this attitude was reinforced by many in the Soviet government.  For 
example, another outspoken critic of Kohl’s ten-point plan was Soviet Foreign Ministry 
spokesman Gennady Gerasimov, who said “there is not one country in Europe today 
which would endorse reunification.”69   
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The issue for Moscow was not so much German unity or the threat that it might 
pose.  The issue for Moscow was two fold: how to reorient the security environment to 
ensure the continued safety of the Soviet Union, and how to manage the domestic 
reaction to the breakdown of empire that was being added to the already real economic 
hardship being experienced by the population.  In this context Shevardnadze writes: 
Thus, from the outset we linked the German unity issue with the problem of 
forming new structures of European security.  We wished to see the unification of 
Germany take place over a fairly extended period.  We needed to bring Soviet public 
opinion around to the realization that it was really happening.  That is why for so long we 
did not consent to Germany’s membership in NATO.70 
In a private conversation with Genscher, Gorbachev commented on Kohl’s ten-
point plan with great anxiety: “How can we talk about ‘building a new Europe’ if you 
[Germany] act this way?  Kohl assured me that the FRG doesn’t want to destabilize the 
situation in the GDR, that he would act responsibly.  But the chancellor’s actual steps 
contradict his assurances.”71  Gorbachev feared the instability that was taking place in the 
GDR.  He deemed any move to speed the process of unification irresponsible.  He 
recognized the dangers of unhindered and reckless decision making without the necessary 
consultations with all parties involved.     
Shevardnadze admits that the Soviet Union had only two options with regard to 
German unification.  The first option was, through the “two-plus-four” mechanism and 
multilateral talks among European countries, to achieve “an agreement on the final legal 
settlement of the German question, which would serve our security interests and the 
cause of stability in Europe.  The second alternative was to use our half-million troops in 
East Germany to block unification.”72  The second alternative was really no option, 
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because German unification was clearly going to happen.  The challenge for Soviet 
statesmen was how to best manage it to a beneficial outcome for the Soviet Union, or at 
least an outcome not to their disadvantage.  
In Moscow, various concepts for the external relationship that a united Germany 
would have with the existing security structures in Europe were discussed.  Ideas ranged 
from a neutral united Germany tied to neither NATO nor the Warsaw Pact, to the reverse: 
a united Germany as a member of both alliance structures, bridging Europe and bringing 
East to West.  Early on, it was decided that neither of these ideas would be realistic, given 
the dynamic political and strategic challenges facing the continent.  Following an April 
1990 meeting in Washington, Shevardnadze, during a press conference, stated:  
We are not persuaded by the argument presented to us in favor of including a 
united Germany in NATO.  We called attention to the one-sided character of such an 
approach and called for a qualitatively new security system in Europe – through the 
consistent transformation of the politico-military alliances, with a subsequent transition to 
nonbloc, collective structures.  Along with other states, the future Germany would take its 
place in this system.73 
In his autobiography, Shevardnadze was able to succinctly summarize the 
objectives of Moscow: “the first was a real reduction of armaments in Europe, including 
those on German soil.  The second was to combine the process of unification with the 
formation of pan-European structures of security.  The third was a reorganization of 
NATO and new relations between the allies.”74  It was from this foundation and 
intellectual prism that the Soviets conducted and concluded the negotiations.  Above all 
Moscow, justifiably feeling strategically vulnerable, wanted German unification 
intrinsically coupled to new security structures in Europe with no dominant player, 
particularly not the Soviet Union’s rival, the United States.  
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This is not to say that Moscow was against NATO per se.  As a matter of fact, 
Moscow saw two merits in NATO.  First, Shevardnadze and some other Soviet leaders 
recognized the stability that NATO had brought to Europe during the preceding forty 
years.  The Alliance had led the way to great economic integration and political 
consultation throughout Western Europe.  Prosperity and peace followed.  Second, with 
the crumbling of the communist governments of the Warsaw Pact and the economic 
turmoil experienced in the Soviet Union, NATO provided a ready-made and stable 
security structure that could be incorporated into a new and wider structure that would 
“reach from Vancouver to Vladivostok.”  The Soviet hope was that NATO would 
transition from a military bloc to a political organization, with its security responsibilities 
being absorbed by an organization like the CSCE.   
What was the Soviet view of the informal assurances that the Allies would not 
extend the jurisdiction of NATO eastward if Moscow accepted a united Germany in 
NATO?  These assurances by Baker to both Shevardnadze and Gorbachev were 
ostensibly made in Moscow on 8 and 9 February 1990.  It is therefore striking that, in the 
first days of the two-plus-four talks in Bonn in May 1990, Shevardnadze announced: “We 
propose that the following principle be observed: Nothing is agreed to until all the aspects 
of a settlement are agreed to, until a complete balance of interests so vital to an 
undertaking of such dimensions as a German settlement is found.”75  While the principle 
is sound and the reasoning respectable, so stated it negated any assurances made prior to 
the opening and completion of the two-plus-four negotiations.  Another fact  undermines 
Moscow’s claim that binding assurances were given by Western governments with regard 
to NATO enlargement following German unification: the final two-plus-four treaty 
included no provision concerning future NATO enlargement.   
Opinions began to shift among decision makers in Moscow in May 1990.  
Following the Soviet Foreign Ministry’s completion of a state-of-Europe review and in 
preparation for the Bush-Gorbachev Washington Summit from 30 May to 2 June 1990, 
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Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze drafted a memorandum to President Gorbachev 
providing guidance and recommendation concerning German unification and a unified 
Germany’s participation in NATO.  In the German unification section he noted:  
After careful consideration, we believe that a united Germany, contrary to our 
long-standing views, will not be a threat to the Soviet Union.  As the matters stand now, 
the countries which should be fearful of [the economic might of] a united Germany are 
the countries of Western Europe.  We and the countries of Eastern Europe, on the other 
hand, are in no position economically to compete with a unified Germany.  What we need 
is economic and financial assistance.  In view of our own difficult situation, we are 
hardly in a position to reject German aid.76   
In the section concerning Germany’s relationship with NATO, Shevardnadze 
wrote:  
Our [Foreign Ministry] answer differs somewhat from the established 
Soviet position that Germany in NATO would be a threat to our territorial 
integrity and security.  The reason for our new position is that a careful 
analysis of NATO shows that the Alliance has changed considerably.  
Indeed they have already changed, and NATO will continue to exist at 
least temporarily for one reason only: to tie the United States to Europe 
through the use of an existing organization – which the Soviet Union has 
favored for some time – although we would prefer to see this tie 
maintained through the mechanism of the 35-nation Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe.77   
He ended his memo by writing that “we should not oppose a united Germany in 
NATO because NATO is changing rapidly and Germany’s presence therein will 
accelerate its transformation and the eventual end of the organization.”78  While the 
advice to Gorbachev from his advisors was to push ahead with negotiations in the 
direction of a united Germany in NATO, Gorbachev continued to slow down the process 
to gain as much advantage as possible.   
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At a joint press conference with Mitterrand held on 25 May 1990 in Moscow, 
Gorbachev was asked by a Novosti Press Agency journalist: “What place did questions 
concerning new all-European security structures and the problem of accelerating the 
creation of new all-European security structures occupy in your talks?”  Gorbachev 
replied, “The President and I devoted a great deal of time to the subject of how we can 
synchronize German unification and the process of creating European security 
structures.”79  It is not surprising that the Soviet Union and France were able to agree on 
the need for new security structures in Europe, as both had reservations concerning 
NATO, particularly U.S. dominance in the organization. They nonetheless also shared the 
widespread view that NATO functioned as a stabilizing European institution.  Gorbachev 
would take his conflicting opinions to his talks with Bush during the Washington Summit 
held from 30 May to 2 June 1990.   
The German question was, as expected, central to the discussions during the 
Washington summit. Gorbachev at one point reverted back to the idea of a united 
Germany with dual membership in both NATO and the Warsaw Pact.  Bush responded 
that that would be “unacceptable.”  On 31 May they reached a compromise based on 
Bush’s recommendation:  
I would suggest…[that] the United States expresses unqualified support 
for the membership of a unified Germany in NATO.  However, if 
Germany itself makes a different choice, we’ll respect that and not raise 
any objection.”  Gorbachev replied, “I agree. I accept your formulation.80   
Gorbachev’s decision to allow Germany to choose which, if either, alliance to join 
was in keeping with the principles outlined in the Helsinki Final Act.   Two specific 
principles directly applied to the German unification discussions.  The first principle 
considered relates to whether the two Germanys could unite.  The Helsinki Final Act 
reads:  
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By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, all 
peoples always have the right, in full freedom, to determine, when and as they wish, their 
internal and external political status, without external interference, and to pursue as they 
wish their political, economic, social and cultural development.81  
Gorbachev’s early recognition of the rights of the German people to unite as one 
country is consistent with the principle outlined above.   
The second principle that was significant to the German unification discussions, 
and the one that encountered much debate, concerns alliance membership.  The Helsinki 
Final Act states that  
[Participating States] will respect each other's right to define and conduct as it 
wishes its relations with other States in accordance with international law and in the spirit 
of the present Declaration.  They also have the right to belong or not to belong to 
international organizations, to be or not to be a party to bilateral or multilateral treaties 
including the right to be or not to be a party to treaties of alliance; they also have the right 
to neutrality.82  
It was this principle that finally influenced Gorbachev to allow Germany to join 
NATO.  Indeed, as Hannes Adomeit has noted, during the 31 May 1990 meeting between 
Bush and Gorbachev the former  
introduced an argument that other US and West German officials had 
begun to employ at lower levels.  Under the CSCE’s principles in the 
Helsinki Final Act, all nations had the right to choose their own 
alliances.83  
Gorbachev agreed, and on 3 June 1990, President Bush, following approval of the 
text by Gorbachev, released a public statement that read: 
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On the matter of Germany’s external alliances, I believe, as do Chancellor Kohl 
and members of the Alliance, that the united Germany should be a full member of 
NATO.  President Gorbachev, frankly, does not hold that view.  But we are in full 
agreement that the matter of alliance membership is, in accordance with the Helsinki 
Final Act, a matter for the Germans to decide.84 
In agreeing, Gorbachev had conceded his hand and relegated the discussion of a 
united Germany in NATO to one of wrapping up the details.   
                                                 
84 Ibid., p. 13. do not use Ibid as first footnote on a page 
 41
VI. CONCLUSION 
This chapter discusses the consequences and implications of the 1990 
misunderstanding between the Soviet Union and key Western governments, including the 
loss of the trust gained during the German unification discussions.     
By pressing the Soviet Union to dramatically shift the European geostrategic 
balance in favor of NATO, the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany 
knowingly threatened an escalation of geopolitical tensions.  While the outcome proved 
worth the risks involved, the United States’ strategic venture could have had vastly 
different results.  Indeed, strategic disputes exist today between NATO and Russia, with 
the latter intermittently referring to its perception of past wrongs by the former as a 
justification for mistrust and apprehension.    
In accepting the inclusion of the united Germany in NATO, the Soviet Union 
essentially forfeited its most significant World War II war-prize and with it the Warsaw 
Pact’s future.  The Soviet system would itself soon collapse, plunging Russia and some 
elements of its former empire into disarray.  While the self-perception of Russians as the 
leaders of a Eurasian empire and a worldwide communist movement was damaged, their 
historical expectations as to their country’s great power status have remained.  Russian 
officials continue to view the world, in particular Eurasia, as divided between “theirs and 
ours.”  According to Hannes Adomeit, a highly regarded German expert on Russia, “A 
major factor limiting Russian multilateralism in NATO (and EU) are persistent Russian 
notions of international relations as a zero-sum game (the gain of one side is the loss of 
the other) and the unmitigated importance of competition, conflict, and the ‘balance of 
power’ in international affairs.”85   He further notes, “Putin also has called the dissolution 
of the Soviet Union a ‘national tragedy of immense proportions’ and the ‘greatest 
geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century.’”86   
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This attitude alone does not necessarily portend international conflict.  What 
raises concern is the combination of this attitude with the perception that Russia has been 
slighted, or – worse – deceived and betrayed.  In 2007 Vyacheslav Igrunov, Director of 
the Institute of Humanities and Political Studies in Moscow, expressed a widespread 
viewpoint in Russia: “It is worth taking into consideration another point, if to recollect 
the first wave of NATO enlargement to the east.  Then Russia appealed to [the] NATO 
promise not to enlarge to the east.  NATO answered that it is not Russia’s problem and 
Russia isn’t entitled to vote.  It is necessary to realize that politics is not only about 
displaying one’s strength, but also about displaying the other party’s weakness.”87  The 
building blocks of trust that had been formed between NATO and the Soviet Union 
during the German unification process – and carried forward in NATO-Russian relations 
after 1991 – now appear to have crumbled.   
Discussions about expanding the Alliance began in early 1993.  By 1999, NATO 
had expanded to include three former Warsaw Pact members (the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, and Poland).  The decision to expand NATO was not without controversy, nor 
did opponents forget the promises made to the USSR.  During this first round of NATO 
expansion discussions a leading Russian political scientist, Sergei Karaganov, expressed 
his perspective as follows: 
For Russians, NATO expansion is a psychological question as much as a strategic 
one; it involves mutual trust and Western recognition of Russia’s status.  Expansion 
would result in a shift in the whole Russian perception of the West…It would confirm a 
feeling of having been if not defeated, then at least tricked and framed.  In 1990, we were 
told quite clearly by the West that the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and German 
unification would not lead to NATO expansion.88 
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Karaganov effectively expressed the prevailing opinion of leading Russian policy 
makers and addressed both the issues of trust and prior assurance given to Russia.   
While the controversy about the assurances offered to Moscow persisted during 
the first round of NATO expansion discussions, it is not limited to that time frame; the 
alleged assurances continue to have profound implications and effects today.   
From a Russian perspective, the Alliance has continued to ignore Russian protests 
concerning NATO expansion and Russia’s strategic isolation.  In 2004 seven more 
countries joined NATO, exacerbating Russian-NATO tensions.  While the United States 
and the Federal Republic of Germany may not have intended to give assurances to the 
Soviet Union not to expand NATO eastward in exchange for Moscow’s acceptance of 
Germany in NATO, this message was clearly received in Moscow.  The trust that was 
built between Moscow and the Alliance during the dynamic European transition of 1990-
1991 has been effectively lost.  In an interview in May 2008, Mikhail Gorbachev spoke 
of the lost trust between Russia and the United States: “The Americans promised that 
NATO wouldn't move beyond the boundaries of Germany after the Cold War but now 
half of central and eastern Europe are members, so what happened to their promises? It 
shows they cannot be trusted.”89   
At the heart of the matter is Russia’s claim to have a special sphere of influence.  
Many Russians hold that the further expansion of NATO to the east encroaches on their 
national interests.  As Derek Averre of the University of Birmingham has observed, “The 
Russian Federation (RF) inherited the expectation that the West would heed its opinion 
on the main European security issues and would unconditionally acknowledge the CIS 
[Commonwealth of Independent States] as a sphere of vital interest to Russia.”90  Russian 
President Dmitry Medvedev confirmed this judgment recently when he laid out five 
guiding principles in Russian foreign policy.  One of these principles was that Russia is 
entitled to a sphere of influence:  
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Russia, just like other countries in the world, has regions where it has its 
privileged interests. In these regions, there are countries with which we have traditionally 
had friendly cordial relations, historically special relations. We will work very attentively 
in these regions and develop these friendly relations with these states, with our close 
neighbors.91 
The problem with this expectation by Russia is what it implies.  If, in fact, Russia 
had a legitimate claim to special privileges in the regions that made up its former empire, 
the right of nations to self-determination that Soviet leaders from Brezhnev to Gorbachev 
(as well as post-Soviet Russian leaders) recognized in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 
would not be respected.  Additionally, the very argument that Russia has a legitimate 
sphere of influence that the West should respect undermines the claim that Russia is not a 
threat to its neighbors.  Indeed, the argument that Moscow has a right to a sphere of 
influence can be viewed as imperialistic in nature.   
Whether the apparent misunderstanding on Moscow’s part about NATO’s 
enlargement options after German unification could have been avoided through more 
precise diplomatic discussions may never be known.  It is clear that the vague informal 
assurances given to the Soviet Union concerning NATO expansion in 1990, even if 
withdrawn or reformulated by the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, 
still remain prominent in Russian thinking and provide a crutch that Russians use to prop 
up their argument as to betrayal by the West.  NATO governments may therefore expect 
to hear more in the future from Russia about broken promises and warranted suspicion 
towards the West.   
Many observers in Central and Eastern Europe maintain that Russia is still a 
threat to their security.  This view has been recently substantiated by threats to Poland 
coming from Russia in response to the U.S.-Polish agreement to base U.S. missile 
defense interceptors on Polish territory.  “In a chilling echo of the Cold War, Russia gave 
warning that Poland was ‘exposing itself to a strike — 100 per cent’ after signing a deal 
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with the US to set up a missile shield on Polish soil.”92  This statement by General 
Anatoli Nogovitsyn, the deputy chief of the general staff in Moscow, raised tension 
between the two countries to levels not seen since the end of the Cold War.  Nogovitsyn 
said “that Russian military doctrine sanctioned the use of nuclear weapons ‘against the 
allies of countries having nuclear weapons if they in some way help them’, as Poland had 
done in signing the deal.”93  While this and similar Russian threats are seen by some in 
Europe as clearly provocative, other Europeans regard the Russian threats as saber 
rattling in order to express a clear objection to continued NATO encroachment into 
Russia’s “privileged spaces.”  Russian policy makers are evidently concerned about U.S. 
dominance in NATO, the principal organization for collective defense in Europe.   
As during the Cold War, many in Russia see in NATO expansion the drawing of 
new dividing lines in Europe with Russia on the opposing side.  President Medvedev 
spoke of this at to the World Policy Conference in Evian, France, on 8 October 2008: 
“But the real issue is that NATO is bringing its military infrastructure right up to our 
borders and is drawing new dividing lines in Europe, this time along our western and 
southern frontiers.”94  Russia continues to interpret NATO’s enlargement policy as 
confrontational.  Since NATO expansion was first officially discussed in 1993, Russian’s 
maintain, Moscow’s requests for restraint and respect for its security interests have gone 
largely ignored.  With no expectation that NATO’s behavior will change, Russia has 
made moves that appear to be intended to rebalance the geopolitical dynamic. 
Unable to effectively stop the expansion of NATO, or gain the influence it seeks 
in European security decision-making, Russia has promoted multipolarity as a means to 
regain international “great power” status and counter what is perceived as US unipolarity.  
According to Thomas Ambrosio, associate professor of political science at North Dakota 
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State University, “Russia’s quest for multipolarity is aimed at creating conditions in 
which Russia can effectively resist American military, geopolitical, and economic 
encroachment.”95  In Ambrosio’s view, Russia is not seeking means of offensive action, 
but is engaged in defensive maneuvering.  “Rather than seeking direct confrontation with 
the United States, great powers will attempt to create conditions which allow for them to 
resist US influence and protect traditional spheres of influence from American 
encroachment.”96  In an effort to engage other disgruntled powers, Moscow has looked to 
Beijing.   
With a common interest in hedging against the mutually perceived emerging 
American hegemony, Russia and China released a joint communiqué following an April 
1996 Beijing summit that identified “‘hegemonism, power politics and repeated 
imposition of pressure on other countries’ among the most serious problems facing the 
international community.”97  Over the years the Sino-Russian relationship has continued 
to develop from its once conflicted past.   Under the auspices of the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization (SCO), an organization to improve trust and cooperation in 
shared border areas, Russia and China have conducted two joint military exercises: 
“Peace Mission 2005” in China in August 2005 and “Peace Mission 2007” in Russia in 
August 2007.  Peace Mission 2005 involved just Russia and China, while Peace Mission 
2007 involved all the members of the SCO (China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, 
Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan).  The SCO activities constitute an example of the attempts at 
multi-polar balancing that may be motivated in fact by a determination to respond to 
NATO enlargement. 
On 23 May 2008 Russia’s newly elected President, Dmitry Medvedev, in an 
unusual political move, made his first foreign visit not to Europe, as might have been 
expected, but to China.  This political move could be indicative of a continuing strategic 
shift from West to East or simply a message to the West, particularly to the United States, 
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that neither Russia nor China will be deterred from acting on a shared view of United 
States hegemonic dominance.  "Some don't like such strategic cooperation between our 
countries, but we understand that this cooperation serves the interests of our people, and 
we will strengthen it, regardless of whether others like it or not," the Russian leader said. 
"Russian-Chinese relations are one of the most important factors of maintaining stability 
in modern conditions."98    This visit by President Medvedev to Beijing took place shortly 
after the NATO Bucharest Summit in April 2008.   
In another blow to Russian prestige and perceived disregard for its security 
interests, NATO leaders announced at the April 2008 Bucharest Summit:  “NATO 
welcomes Ukraine’s and Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership in NATO.  
We agreed today that these countries will become members of NATO.”99   With no 
Membership Action Plan offered, the stated acknowledgment that eventual membership 
is certain was quite unusual.    
It is clear that compromises within NATO are required to manage diverging 
interests among the Allies.  On the one hand, several NATO European nations have an 
interdependent relationship with Russia with respect to energy resources.  These interests 
no doubt play an important role in European-Russian relations and require consideration 
from the United States if agreements are to be reached that may provoke further irritation 
in Russia.  On the other hand, the United States and some other members of NATO see 
the expansion of NATO to encompass former Soviet republics as bringing a measure of 
stability to historically volatile regions.  Many former Soviet republics – as well as many 
former Soviet satellite states of Central and Eastern Europe that are now members of 
NATO – fear a resurgent Russia and look to NATO to provide protection.  Faced with the 
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prospect of NATO reaching Russia’s southern and western border, some Russians may 
have decided to make the threat of large-scale war sufficiently daunting to dampen the 
will of the NATO Allies to expand the Alliance.   
The origins of the conflict in Georgia in August 2008 have a complex history that 
is outside the scope of this thesis. However, it is important to frame some key facts about 
this conflict and to consider the possible linkage to Russian objections to NATO 
enlargement.  The February 2008 recognition of the independence of Kosovo by the 
United States and many European Union countries was met with strong disapproval by 
Russia and, not surprisingly, Georgia.  While their positions on Kosovo were similar, 
their motivations were quite different.  For Russia, the opposition to Kosovar 
independence stemmed from its steady support of Serbia and the mandate to maintain the 
territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia outlined in UNSC Resolution 
1244, which established the peace operations conducted in Kosovo since June 1999.  
Russia sees the recognition of Kosovar independence as a clear violation of this UNSC 
mandate and therefore as inconsistent with international norms and established 
international law.  Moreover, Moscow fears that recognition of Kosovar independence 
could function as an invitation for secessionist movements that would directly affect 
Russia’s own territorial integrity and domestic security.   
Georgia’s opposition to Kosovar independence is directly connected to the 
breakaway Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.  Since the early 1990s 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia have exercised de facto autonomy in conjunction with their 
unrecognized claim of independence from Georgia.  While Moscow had withheld 
recognition of independence for Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russia supported the desire 
for autonomous governance in these regions of Georgia.  Moscow repeatedly reaffirmed 
support for Georgia’s territorial integrity in UNSC resolutions, but also provided an 
economic life-line to Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as well as Russian passports to many 
of the residents of the regions. 
Longstanding tensions between Moscow and Tbilisi took a distinctly upward turn 
in April 2008 when Russia accused Georgia of a military buildup on the borders of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia: “A Russian Foreign Ministry official has accused Georgia 
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of building up its military near the country's breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia, and warned that Russian forces will defend the areas if they are attacked.”100  
This buildup of Georgian forces may have been intended to send a clear message to 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia to refrain from further independence efforts that might be 
considered in light of Kosovo’s success.  In response to Georgia’s military moves Russia 
began a reinforcement of its peacekeeping forces, which have been in place in the regions 
since 1994.   This action can also be interpreted as directed against the NATO 
announcement of an open invitation to Georgia and Ukraine for alliance membership.  By 
drawing attention to the instability at the Georgian border, Russia might have hoped to 
deter NATO allies from extending a membership invitation to Georgia, given the 
implications of honoring NATO’s Article 5 obligations.  This appears to have been one 
of the consequences of the August 2008 invasion of Georgia by Russian forces.   
On 8 August 2008, following an attempt by Georgian military forces to “liberate” 
South Ossetia from its Moscow-supported leadership the previous day, Russian military 
forces invaded Georgia with the objective, as stated by Russian President Medvedev, of 
“protect[ing] the lives and dignity of Russian citizens wherever they may be.”101  While 
there is much debate as to which side was the provocateur, this first combat action by 
Russian forces outside their borders since the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 
1989 caused international alarm and continues to have serious implications.   
On 26 August 2008 President Medvedev announced that Russia had recognized 
the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia: “‘they addressed to Russia with a 
request to recognize their independence. Taking into consideration the free will of the 
peoples, the UN Charter and OSCE documents, I have signed decrees to recognize the 
independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia on behalf of the Russian Federation. This is 
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the only way to save people’s lives,’ Medvedev said.” 102  While this move by Moscow to 
recognize South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent countries has been met with almost 
universal condemnation, it has definitely put on hold the prospects for NATO 
membership of Georgia and Ukraine.  On 2 December 2008 NATO foreign ministers 
decided to postpone offers of a Membership Action Plan (MAP) to Georgia and Ukraine.  
According to a Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty report, “the fact remains – and was 
stressed by both NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer and U.S. Secretary of 
State Condoleezza Rice – that both Georgia and Ukraine still fall short of basic NATO 
standards in terms of both political reform and military readiness.”103  While the stated 
reason was internal unpreparedness, one cannot exclude the impact the Russia-Georgia 
conflict had on NATO’s willingness to further antagonize Moscow with MAP offers to 
Ukraine and Georgia.   
Owing in part to Moscow’s consistent resistance to what it sees as NATO 
dominance in European security decision-making and firm opposition to perceived US 
hegemonic behavior, Russia continues to make proposals for the establishment of new 
European security institutions.  According to Vladimir Socor, Russia “wants an OSCE 
summit to create a new, Euro-Atlantic-Eurasian security framework that would override 
NATO and give Russia – on a par with NATO, the United States, and the European 
Union – a decision-making role in the new, overarching framework.  This would result in 
an OSCE-like system, with Russia as a veto-wielding party.”104  A 5 December 2008 
statement by the Delegation of Romania on behalf of NATO responded to the Russian 
call for greater cooperation in European security: “Russia’s action in Georgia ‘called into 
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question Russia’s commitment to fundamental OSCE principles.’”105  It appears that the 
Russian arguments for cooperation and trust are falling on unreceptive ears with little 
prospect for a future commitment from NATO or European Union nations to embrace 
Russian proposals for a new framework for security.   
Signs of Russian belligerence have persisted.  In defense of the February 2009 
decision to pursue the closure of the American base in Kyrgyzstan, Igor V. Barinov, a 
member of the Russian Parliament, presented his view of the circumstances:  
A lot of these things…are the consequences of the attitude that NATO takes and 
has taken in recent years toward mutually important issues that touch upon the interests 
of Russia – beginning with the Balkans and Yugoslavia, Kosovo, NATO moving 
eastward, to Ukraine and Georgia, the Baltic states.  And if more attention had been paid 
toward Russia’s opinion, then the situation would now be much better.106  
Barinov’s statement can be seen as a consequence of NATO not fulfilling the 
three primary goals that Shevardnadze identified as being important to the Soviet Union 
during the German unification discussions in 1990: first, a real reduction of armaments in 
Europe; second, the formation of new pan-European structures of security; and third, a 
reorganization of NATO as a more purely political organization and the establishment of 
new relations among the allies and with Russia.107  While armaments in most of Europe 
have been lowered from Cold War levels, the second and third goals remain distant.  
Russia’s sustained pursuit of these goals is linked to its continuing sense of grievance 
about NATO’s enlargement process and its conviction that Moscow was offered 
assurances in 1990 that have not been honored. 
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